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Regulating Data Breaches: A Data
Superfund Statute
ABSTRACT
Collecting and processing large amounts of personal data has
become a fundamental feature of the modern economy. Personal data,
combined with good data analytics, are valuable to businesses as they
can provide highly detailed information about individual preferences
and behaviors. This data collection can also be valuable to the consumer
as it generates innovative products and digital platforms. The era of
big data promises great rewards, but it is not without its costs.
Data breaches, or the release of personal data into unwanted hands,
are pervasive and increasingly massive in scale. Despite the personal
privacy harm caused by data breaches, businesses can largely
externalize the costs of these breaches to the public. While privacy
harm is undoubtedly an important issue, the release of data
generates arguably more significant social costs. This Note argues that
policy makers should view the unwanted release of data as a form of
pollution that dilutes critical public goods. As such, an effective
regulatory solution to data breaches should mirror the current
regulatory approaches to environmental pollution. Like the physical
environment, the data environment is a complex and highly
interconnected system; accordingly, there is unlikely to be a single best
way to regulate it. Thus far, the United States has approached data
regulation in a stepwise and targeted fashion, much like environmental
regulation. This approach has some advantages, but there is a pressing
need for more comprehensive regulation. Current proposals point to
omnibus privacy laws like the European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation and the California Consumer Privacy Act as a
solution. However, these regulations are ultimately privacy focused and
impose high costs on the data economy. To balance these concerns, this
Note proposes that Congress enact federal legislation implementing a
data protection statute modeled after the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.
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In 2019, approximately 540 million Facebook user records were
released to the public on Amazon’s cloud computing service by two
third-party Facebook app developers.1 This included a wealth of
personal data, such as account names, IDs, location check-ins,
unprotected passwords, and general user activity.2 This data breach3 is
1.
Jason Silverstein, Hundreds of Millions of Facebook User Records Were Exposed on
Amazon Cloud Server, CBS NEWS (Apr. 4, 2019, 11:35 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/millions-facebook-user-records-exposed-amazon-cloud-server/ [https://perma.cc/B5D7-Y4KE].
2.
See id.
3.
See Kevin Ferguson, Data Breach, SEARCHSECURITY: TECHTARGET, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/data-breach [https://perma.cc/M3YC-BJXU] (last updated May
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one of the largest of all time.4 However, this was not the first time in
recent years that Facebook—a company with personal data pertaining
to over 2.3 billion active monthly users worldwide—had suffered a
major data breach.5 Even more concerning, Facebook is not alone. In
2019, major breaches also affected well-known entities such as
Microsoft, Instagram, Adobe, DoorDash, and Fortnite.6
In an information-age economy increasingly driven by the
collection of data,7 these data breaches are not going away. Americans
transmit their data through personal computers, mobile phones, and
internet devices to private companies at an exponential rate.8 By 2025,
the proliferation of these devices means that each person with an
internet-connected device will have at least one data interaction every
eighteen seconds, or almost five thousand per day.9 As institutions
collect this increasingly large pool of consumer data, the risk of
exposure will continue to grow.10
In light of these trends, this Note argues that current
government intervention is insufficient to protect the public from data
breaches affecting private firms. Part I begins with a discussion of
current data collection practices and explains why personal and
economic incentives fail to effectively police firm behavior. It further
provides an overview of relevant privacy laws and the various
regulatory regimes that serve to protect consumer data in the United
States. Part II addresses the limitations and shortcomings of that
regulatory regime, particularly with regard to newer legislation such as
the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and the European Union’s
2019) (defining data breach). When “sensitive, confidential or otherwise protected data” such as
this are either accessed or disclosed by an unauthorized party, it is referred to as a data breach.
Id.
4.
Kenneth Kiesnoski, 5 of the Biggest Data Breaches Ever, CNBC (July 30, 2019,
10:22
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/30/five-of-the-biggest-data-breaches-ever.html
[https://perma.cc/CV4Y-ACSW].
5.
Silverstein, supra note 1. In 2018, the information of 50 million users was exposed in
an attack on Facebook’s networks, and in 2016 it was revealed that Cambridge Analytica, a
company working on the Trump campaign, gained access to information from more than 87 million
users. Id.
6.
Rob Sobers, 107 Must-Know Data Breach Statistics for 2020, VARONIS, https://www.varonis.com/blog/data-breach-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/2QJZ-Z38Y] (last updated Sept. 24, 2020).
7.
See Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/05/06/data-is-giving-rise-to-a-new-economy
[https://perma.cc/WLX7-XKZ2].
8.
See STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN & CHRIS D. LINEBAUGH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45631, DATA
PROTECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2019).
9.
Joseph V. DeMarco & Brian A. Fox, Data Rights and Data Wrongs: Civil Litigation
and the New Privacy Norms, 128 YALE L.J.F. 1016, 1020 (2019).
10.
See MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 1–2.

652

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:3:649

General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Part III explores the
similarity between data breaches and environmental pollution. It
argues that the environmental laws that regulate the release of
hazardous substances can serve as an effective model for regulating
data pollution. Specifically, this Note recommends that Congress
implement a federal statute modeled after the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
also known as the Superfund Statute. Such a liability-focused regime,
along with certain prescriptive requirements, would incentivize better
data protection at a minimal cost.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Current Data Practices
1. Data Collection
Companies derive significant economic benefits from
aggregating personal data and selling it to third parties.11 Data brokers,
an important subsection of firms that collect and sell data, demonstrate
how profitable this practice can be. These firms collect a wide range of
data, such as “bankruptcy information, voting registration, consumer
purchase data, web browsing activities, warranty registrations, and
other details of consumers’ everyday interactions.”12 Once collected and
aggregated, brokers sell this data to businesses for a variety of
purposes, such as sending targeted advertisements or verifying
identities to mitigate risk.13 The nine firms mentioned in the report
alone collect data on billions of individuals, including one firm that had
over three thousand data segments for nearly every US consumer.14
Indeed, in an industry that includes between 2,500 and 4,000 data
brokers, these nine brokers generated $426 million in annual revenue.15
A data broker’s objective in gathering all of this data is to create
an easily accessible compendium of consumer information that provides
11.
See Patrick Myers, Protecting Personal Information: Achieving a Balance Between
User Privacy and Behavioral Targeting, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 717, 723 (2016).
12.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY iv (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-calltransparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W56-YA5N].
13.
Id. at ii–iii.
14.
Id. at 8–9.
15.
Id. at 23; Paul Boutin, The Secretive World of Selling Data About You, NEWSWEEK
(May 30, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/secretive-world-selling-data-about-you464789 [https://perma.cc/H9K3-YRUW].
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powerful insight into consumer preferences.16 Data are collected from a
variety of sources including government databases, social media, and
commercial sources.17 Each source may provide only a few data
elements about a consumer, but, once combined, even information that
is seemingly anonymous can be used to create a shockingly
comprehensive profile of an individual.18 With this information, a firm
could match an individual’s browser history with her profile to
“identify” the consumer and target her with advertisements for
products that she might be more likely to purchase.19 Taken a step
further, these individual behaviors can then be grouped together and
used to identify generalizable patterns of behavior.20 The result is a
powerful tool with vast potential in the commercial realm21 and
beyond.22
2. The Consumer Privacy Paradox
Although society stands to benefit from data collection,
consumers do not know the scope or quantity of personal data that firms
collect23 and are concerned about how firms use their data.24 For
instance, data collection practices in the data broker industry make it
nearly impossible for consumers to control the spread of personal data.25
Unlike large, identifiable companies like Facebook, these brokers are
shrouded in obscurity and avoid name recognition.26 Data are often not
collected directly from consumers and can be resold freely among
16.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 12, at 31.
17.
Id. at 11, 13.
18.
Id. at 46.
19.
Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation,
or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 445–47 (2011).
20.
See Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 104, 112, 114 (2019).
21.
See generally FORBES INSIGHTS, THE BIG POTENTIAL OF BIG DATA: A FIELD GUIDE
FOR
CMOS
(2013),
https://images.forbes.com/forbesinsights/StudyPDFs/RocketFuel_BigData_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/WKE6-UVU8].
22.
See, e.g., Sabyasachi Dash, Sushil Kumar Shakyawar, Mohit Sharma & Sandeep
Kaushik, Big Data in Healthcare: Management, Analysis and Future Prospects, 6 J. BIG DATA,
no. 1, 2019, at 1; Nir Kshetri, The Emerging Role of Big Data in Key Development Issues:
Opportunities, Challenges, and Concerns, BIG DATA & SOCIETY, July–Dec. 2014, at 1 (2014).
23.
See FED TRADE COMM’N, supra note 12, at 46.
24.
Brooke Auxier, Lee Rainie, Monica Anderson, Andrew Perrin, Madhu Kumar & Erica
Turner, Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of Control over Their
Personal Information, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-theirpersonal-information/ [https://perma.cc/2NLD-LH2E].
25.
See FED TRADE COMM’N, supra note 12.
26.
See Theodore Rostow, What Happens When an Acquaintance Buys Your Data: A New
Privacy Harm in the Age of Data Brokers, 34 YALE J. ON REGUL. 667, 674 (2017).
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brokers.27 Moreover, even if a consumer shared limited personal
information with an identifiable and trusted firm, she may have
unknowingly granted its unrestricted use by any data broker willing to
pay the price.28
Of course, most firms ask consumers to consent to a privacy
agreement; thus, consumers arguably should know their data can be
sold to third parties.29 The voluntary transfer of data in exchange for a
specific web or app product could be seen as a legitimate transaction
between the user and the firm. For example, courts regularly uphold
the validity of “click-wrap agreements,” where users agree to the terms
of complex privacy agreements with the simple click of a button.30
However, studies indicate that users typically do not read these policies,
and, even if they do, many agreements do not make it clear that user
data can be sold to third parties.31
Overall, consumers seem to express a preference for privacy
while continuing to blindly agree to policies and share personal data.32
This phenomenon is sometimes labeled as the privacy paradox.33
Consumers engage in a form of hyperbolic discounting, where they give
up potentially valuable data in exchange for short-term and somewhat
meager rewards.34 Consumers also seem to continue to provide data to
companies even after major breaches.35 Indeed, even though consumers
are concerned about their personal data generally, they have mixed
attitudes concerning specific uses.36

27.
See FED TRADE COMM’N, supra note 12.
28.
See Myers, supra note 11, at 724.
29.
See id.
30.
Id. at 732–33.
31.
See id. at 724; Auxier et al., supra note 24 (finding that only 22 percent of adults claim
to always or sometimes read privacy polices). One study showed that 74 percent of participants
consented to a fake social media website’s privacy policy without even reading the terms. Jonathan
A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the Privacy Policies and
Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, 23 INFO., COMMC’N & SOC’Y 128 (2020).
32.
See Christine S. Wilson, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Future
of Privacy Forum: A Defining Moment for Privacy: The Time Is Ripe for Federal Privacy
Legislation (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
1566337/commissioner_wilson_privacy_forum_speech_02-06-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YB2YFFYE].
33.
See, e.g., id.
34.
See id.
35.
See John Naughton, The Privacy Paradox: Why Do People Keep Using Tech Firms That
Abuse Their Data?, GUARDIAN (May 5, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/05/privacy-paradox-why-do-people-keep-using-tech-firms-data-facebook-scandal
[https://perma.cc/87GQ-3PEL].
36.
See Auxier et al., supra note 24. In a Pew Research survey, 48 percent of respondents
believed it was acceptable for DNA testing companies to share customer genetic data to help solve
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3. Externalizing Costs
There are many reasons why data breaches occur. Although
sometimes the source is an outside attacker, many data breaches occur
because of inadvertent disclosures by company insiders.37 Regardless of
the source, individuals tend to hold the business itself accountable.38
Indeed, some notable data breaches have resulted in a stream of
negative publicity and public outcry,39 and firms can face tort liability,
often in the form of class action lawsuits.40 While this certainly
imposes some costs on firms, they can frequently escape significant
consequences.41 For example, a data breach can lead to a decrease in
stock price or negative public perception, but these negative effects are
generally short-lived.42 In addition, tort law remedies are notoriously
difficult to obtain and have failed to keep pace with changing data
practices.43 Even when obtained, damages are often minimal compared
to the revenue of companies dealing in data.44 Moreover, the harm of a
breach is not something that can really be undone.45 Once released, data
can be copied and shared quickly with little cost. Damages may pay for
identity theft monitoring, but ultimately the disclosure costs will
continue to be carried by consumers. The result is a market failure

crimes, while only 25 percent believed it was acceptable for makers of smart speakers to share
personal audio data for the same purposes. Id.
37.
See Long Cheng, Fang Liu & Danfeng Yao, Enterprise Data Breach: Causes,
Challenges, Prevention, and Future Directions, WIRES DATA MINING & KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY,
Sept.–Oct. 2017, at 1, 3–5.
38.
Tara Seals, Consumers Overwhelmingly Blame Businesses for Breaches,
INFOSECURITY MAG. (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/consumersoverwhelmingly-blame/ [https://perma.cc/LAJ5-YB25].
39.
See, e.g., Tony Romm, Senators Slam Equifax, Marriott Executives for Massive Data
Breaches, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2019, 12:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2019/03/07/senators-slam-equifax-marriott-executives-massive-data-breaches/ [https://perma.cc/
3UV7-L79V].
40.
See generally Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a
Common Law Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J.F. 614, 634 (2018).
41.
See, e.g., Josephine Wolff, Opinion, Why It’s So Hard to Punish Companies for Data
Breaches, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/16/opinion/facebook-databreach-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/C84L-VC9S]; Naughton, supra note 35.
42.
See Wolff, supra note 41. In fact, firms may not know how to utilize or value consumer
data. See Jeanne W. Ross, Cynthia M. Beath & Anne Quaadgras, You May Not Need Big Data
After All, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2013, https://hbr.org/2013/12/you-may-not-need-big-data-after-all
[https://perma.cc/XLG5-Y68G].
43.
See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1918 (2010).
44.
See Wolff, supra note 41.
45.
See Solow-Niederman, supra note 40, at 624.
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where firms externalize a significant portion of the cost of data
collection onto consumers.46
B. Current Privacy Regulation
The United States regulates commercial data protection through
a combination of federal statutes, state statutes, tort actions, and
private contracts.47 These regulations generally fall under the umbrella
of privacy law.48 Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the Constitution provides certain protections regarding individual
privacy.49 However, the type of privacy contemplated by these
constitutional protections is conceptually distinct from the protection of
personal data at issue here.50
1. Comparing Federal Statutes
Unlike other jurisdictions, such as the European Union, there is
no omnibus federal privacy legislation that governs commercial data
practices in the United States.51 Instead, there is a patchwork of
targeted data protection statutes at the federal level, with the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) left to fill in the gaps.52 Federal statutes
either regulate specific industry participants, such as financial
institutions, health care entities, and communications common
carriers, or specific categories of data, like data pertaining to minors.53
The scope and protections of these statutes are by no means
uniform.54 Some succeed in preventing certain abuses while failing to
protect against others. For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) applies to a variety of entities that handle data relating to
consumer creditworthiness.55 Regulations require that collected data
are accurate and only used for limited purposes.56 The FTC and

46.
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 20, at 107.
47.
See L. BUS. RSCH., THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW
271–72 (Alan Charles Raul ed., 2014).
48.
See id. at 272.
49.
See MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 5.
50.
See id. at 5–7.
51.
See id. at 7–8.
52.
See id.
53.
See id.
54.
Id. at 2.
55.
Id. at 12 (including “(1) credit reporting agencies (CRAs), (2) entities furnishing
information to CRAs (furnishers), and (3) individuals who use credit reports issued by CRAs
(users)”).
56.
Id.
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) jointly enforce the
provisions of the FCRA.57 There is also a private cause of action for
consumers that are injured by willful or negligent violations of the Act.58
On the one hand, the statutory scheme limits data sharing by placing
restrictions on data that are important to consumers but largely out of
their control.59 On the other hand, the scheme still allows for free
disclosure of information to third parties without consumer consent and
does not require entities to actually protect data from breaches.60
The law regulating health care entities, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), is a good example of a more
comprehensive statute. HIPAA and the accompanying HIPAA Privacy
Rule provide robust safeguards for protected health information
(PHI).61 Covered entities and their business associates cannot use or
share PHI without disclosing their purpose to consumers and obtaining
consent.62 With respect to data security, covered entities must put in
place certain safeguards and are required to notify individuals in the
event of a breach.63 However, since the statute regulates specific
covered entities, it only protects “channels of data flow,” rather than
actual categories of data.64 In other words, data that are categorically
similar but generated through inferences from data collected by
nonregulated entities are not protected.65 For example, HIPAA does not
apply to health data collected through Fitbit or Apple Watches.66 The
end result is vast reservoirs of data that can be bought and sold relating
to the health and physiology of individuals with no specific federal
protection.67
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) does
more to address the “channels of data” critique68 by protecting data
categorically.69 COPPA prohibits websites from collecting essentially
any identifiable data about children under thirteen without verifiable
parental consent.70 The requirements of COPPA are delineated and
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 14.
Id.
See id. at 44.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id.
See Rostow, supra note 26, at 677.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 678.
See id.
MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 24.
Id.

658

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:3:649

enforced by the FTC through the COPPA Rule.71 Notably, firms that
collect data on minors must take reasonable procedures to protect their
confidentiality, comply with deletion and retention requirements, and
limit sharing to third parties.72 However, COPPA only applies to
operators of websites or online activities “directed at children” (as
defined by the FTC), or operators with actual knowledge they are
collecting children’s data.73 In practice, firms can evade the COPPA
Rule’s requirements with a formal policy banning children under
thirteen and either a self-identification request or not asking for a user’s
age at all.74 Moreover, a violation of the COPPA Rule is treated the
same as a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act (discussed Section I.B.2
below).75 So while the FTC may impose civil penalties, there are no
criminal penalties or private causes of action available under the Act.76
2. The Federal Trade Commission
Personal data that are not protected by a specific statute are
primarily regulated by the FTC through the FTC Act.77 Section 5 of the
FTC Act declares “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce” unlawful.78 Private actors that are not regulated by a
specific federal statute include merchants such as Macy’s or Amazon
and prominent technology firms like Facebook and Google.79 The FTC
has brought hundreds of enforcement actions against firms under
Section 5, but most of these actions result in settlements.80 As such,
there is very little case law on the subject.81 Instead, a collection of
consent decrees, although not technically binding precedent, effectively
creates a common law of privacy.82

71.
Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July
2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequentlyasked-questions#General%20Questions [https://perma.cc/TF8K-HVF9].
72.
MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 24.
73.
16 C.F.R. § 312.3 (2020).
74.
See Shannon Finnegan, How Facebook Beat the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act: A Look into the Continued Ineffectiveness of COPPA and How to Hold Social Media Sites
Accountable in the Future, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 827, 839–41 (2020).
75.
15 U.S.C. § 6502(c); MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 25.
76.
MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 25.
77.
Id. at 30.
78.
15 U.S.C. § 45.
79.
Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014).
80.
MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 32.
81.
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 79, at 588.
82.
Id. at 624.
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The most settled principle in the FTC privacy common law is
that companies are bound by their privacy and data security promises
under the “deceptive” prong of Section 5.83 Examples of deceptive
behavior include violating the terms of a posted privacy policy,
mispresenting intended data use, and not providing notice of data
practices.84 The “unfairness” prong, on the other hand, is employed less
frequently but can still be used beyond the scope of the “deceptive”
prong.85 For example, in FTC v. Frostwire, the FTC alleged that a
peer-to-peer file sharing application had unfair privacy settings because
it shared information immediately upon installation.86 In addition, with
respect to data security in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., the US
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit maintained that a company’s
failure to safeguard personal data may be unfair, even if the company
did not contradict its privacy policy.87
3. State Law
In addition to federal law, all fifty states have laws regulating
privacy and implementing liability for data breaches.88 At the most
basic level, this includes tort and contract law.89 Negligence claims and
class actions can regulate businesses that are inured from data security
issues or fail to protect their customers from foreseeable harm.90
Contracts and implied contracts can protect against data breaches as
part of commercial arrangements.91 Furthermore, many states have
their own regulators policing unfair or deceptive practices modeled
after the FTC.92 Unlike federal law, each state also has its own data
breach law requiring a notification response or imposing liability on
companies in the event of a data breach.93
Notably, in 2018, California passed a particularly ambitious
state privacy law, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).94 The
83.
MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 32.
84.
Id. at 32–33.
85.
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 79, at 628, 638.
86.
Complaint at 1, 13, FTC v. Frostwire LLC, No. 1:11-cv-23643 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2011).
87.
FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 245–46 (3d Cir. 2015).
88.
MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 36–37.
89.
Id. at 36.
90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 37.
92.
See id.
93.
Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (July 17, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breachnotification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/BT55-WLPN].
94.
MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 37.
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CCPA categorically protects all “personal information” of Californians,
which is defined broadly to include nearly any information a business
might collect.95 Its provisions apply to any business that collects
information from Californians, does business in California, and
satisfies one of three threshold requirements.96 The CCPA specifies
certain consumer rights, including the right to know why and what data
firms are collecting, the right to opt out of the sale of personal data, and
the right to demand that a company delete personal information.97
Regarding data protection, the Act provides a private cause of action
for consumers whose “nonencrypted and nonredacted personal
information” is subject to an unauthorized disclosure as a result of a
business’s failure to “implement reasonable security procedures and
practices.”98 The proceeds from penalties and settlements under the Act
are deposited in a Consumer Privacy Fund, which is used to offset the
administration costs.99 When the CCPA was initially passed, the state
attorney general was responsible for enforcement.100 However, in
November 2020, California passed Proposition 24, which provides for
the creation of a new state consumer privacy agency.101
II. ANALYSIS
A. The True Cost of a Data Breach
1. Public Harms
Current law regulating the use of personal data is focused on
individual consumer privacy.102 Individual privacy is undoubtedly at
95.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o) (West 2020) (“‘Personal information’ means
information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or
could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”);
MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 38. The CCPA, however, does not apply to data that is
subject to federal regulation like PHI under HIPPA. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.146(a) (West 2020).
96.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c) (West 2020) (defining “business” as having gross
revenues under $25 million, collecting the personal information of fifty thousand customers, or
deriving 50 percent or more of annual revenue from selling consumers information);
MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 38.
97.
MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 38–39.
98.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (West 2020).
99.
MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 39.
100.
Id. at 38.
101.
Cameron F. Kerry & Caitlin Chin, By Passing Proposition 24, California Voters Up
the Ante on Federal Privacy Law, BROOKINGS INST.: TECHTANK (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/11/17/by-passing-proposition-24-california-voters-up-the-ante-onfederal-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/L7U9-HGVT].
102.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (West 2020) (granting rights to
consumers with regards to their personal data); FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236,
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stake when firms store comprehensive profiles of information about
consumers, but the release of data has far more serious implications on
the public as whole.
The greatest danger from data breaches comes from the
predictive power of large aggregations of data sets. Although the
unauthorized disclosure of personal information tends to capture the
public’s attention, data can be deployed to provide insights into almost
any human behavior.103 For instance, in 2012, Facebook ran a
particularly troubling experiment where data scientists skewed seven
hundred thousand users’ newsfeeds so that they showed either mostly
positive content or mostly negative content.104 The affected users tended
to post content that corresponded to the type of content on their
newsfeed, which indicated that emotional states could be manipulated
through the network.105 Alternatively, data brokers compile and sell
collections of consumer profiles that identify vulnerable individuals,
labeling them “Rural and Barely Making It,” “Ethnic Second-City
Strugglers,” or “Retiring Empty: Singles.”106 There is already a
potential for abuse when firms legally hold data like this, such as
offering shoppers different discounts or services based on their
geolocation.107 However, it is not hard to imagine how this could be used
to facilitate illegal activity, as was the case in 2004 when criminals

240, 245 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The FTC alleges that, at least since April 2008, Wyndham engaged in
unfair cybersecurity practices that . . . taken together, unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed
consumers’ personal data to unauthorized access and theft.”); MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note
8, at 1–2 (referencing privacy concerns and misuse of personal data by private actors as factors
causing data protection to emerge as a major issue for congressional consideration); Protecting
Consumer Privacy and Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy-security [https://perma.cc/45X5-K98Q] (last visited Feb. 2,
2021) (describing the FTC’s mission: “[t]he agency uses law enforcement, policy initiatives, and
consumer and business education to protect consumers’ personal information”).
103.
See Jacob Ward, Why Data, Not Privacy, Is the Real Danger, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019,
2:49 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/why-data-not-privacy-real-dangern966621 [https://perma.cc/4G68-B8U2].
104.
See Robinson Meyer, Everything We Know About Facebook’s Secret Mood
Manipulation Experiment, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2014/06/everything-we-know-about-facebooks-secret-mood-manipulation-experiment/
373648/ [https://perma.cc/UN2H-4CUL]; see also Adam D. I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory & Jeffrey
T. Hancock, Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social
Networks, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. AM. 8788, 8788 (2014).
105.
Meyer, supra note 104.
106.
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COM., SCI., & TRANSP., 113TH CONG., A R EVIEW OF THE DATA
BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES
17 (Comm. Print 2013) (majority staff report for Chairman Rockefeller).
107.
See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Jeremy Singer-Vine & Ashkan Soltani, Websites Vary
Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534 [https://perma.cc/WV49-NHUH].
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bought data lists from a data broker in order to target seniors with
telemarketing scams.108 The data broker advertised the lists with labels
like “Suffering Seniors,” which corresponded to individuals with cancer
and Alzheimer’s. One list even mocked the credulity of its own
constituents, saying, “[t]hese people are gullible. . . . They want to
believe that their luck can change.”109
Under these circumstances, almost any transfer or release of
data can lead to public harms. Although Facebook only ran its
experiment for a week, several years later Cambridge Analytica
obtained personal data from millions of Facebook accounts and
facilitated the Russian disinformation campaign leading up to the 2016
US Presidential Election.110 There is a clear privacy harm when
Facebook transfers its users’ personal data without permission.
However, this pales in comparison to the institutional harm that could
come from foreign interference in US elections.111
2. Comparing Data Breaches to Pollution
Once understood as a public harm, it follows that data breaches
should be regulated like other public harms. Here, a particularly
compelling model is environmental regulation.112 The release of data is
an unintended by-product of data collection and data-driven
technologies, similar to how pollution—whether it be carbon emissions
or the release of hazardous waste—is an unintended by-product of
manufacturing industrial goods.113 Firms are able to externalize the
costs of their activities onto the general public because the release of
these by-products dilutes public goods.114 In the case of pollution, absent
regulation, firms will contaminate public goods like clean air or water
by improperly disposing of waste.115 While the release of data may not

108.
Charles Duhigg, Bilking the Elderly, with a Corporate Assist, N.Y. TIMES (May 20,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/business/20tele.html [https://perma.cc/JS6J-P526].
109.
Id.
110.
See Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the
Fallout so Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html [https://perma.cc/MVQ4-3Q2N].
111.
See Ward, supra note 103.
112.
See generally Ben-Shahar, supra note 20, at 112–14; Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs
of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL.
L. REV. 241 (2007).
113.
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 20, at 112.
114.
See id.
115.
See STEVEN A. GREENLAW, DAVID SHAPIRO, ERIC DODGE, CYNTHIA GAMEZ, ANDRES
JAUREGUI, DIANE KEENAN, DAN MACDONALD, AMYAZ MOLEDINA, CRAIG RICHARDSON & RALPH
SONENSHINE, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 276–80 (2d ed. 2017).
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initially seem as harmful to the public as polluting clean air or water,
the social harms of data breaches can be just as serious. Preventing the
misuse of data benefits society as whole, for example, by ensuring
elections are fair and free from foreign interference and establishing
protection for the most vulnerable from predatory criminals; without
proper safeguards, the release of data diminishes these public goods.
3. Assessing the Harm
With the understanding that data breaches are public harms, a
regulatory regime concerned mostly with individual privacy does not
fully address the public harm associated with breaches. If a factory was
to negligently dump waste on an individual’s property, that individual
undoubtedly has suffered a personal harm. The government would
likely respond by making such dumping a criminal offense and
requiring companies to dispose of waste at designated sites. But what
if the factory disposes of its waste properly at a dumpsite, and, over
time, this waste seeps into a river, killing wildlife downstream? While
government regulation successfully prevented personal harm to the
individual, the public harm associated with the loss of wildlife remains.
Similarly, a privacy-focused regulation addresses the personal
harm to individuals affected by data breaches, but does not address the
public harm incurred in situations where data are unidentifiable or
individual privacy is not at stake. For example, Strava, a social media
workout app, posted heat maps of users’ movements and locations
around the world.116 Although the individuals were not named, experts
were able to locate US military installations in the Middle East based
on data revealed by service members using Strava.117 Even with a
privacy regime in place, this direct harm to national security could still
have occurred.
B. FTC Limitations and Advantages
1. The FTC’s Limited Ability to Enforce Preventative Measures
The FTC plays a significant and effective role in promoting data
security through its common law regulatory regime.118 Using the
deceptive prong of Section 5 to enforce a firm’s own privacy policy

116.
Richard Pérez-Peña & Matthew Rosenberg, Strava Fitness App Can Reveal Military
Sites, Analysts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/29/world/middleeast/strava-heat-map.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/S2UT-EEAA].
117.
Id.
118.
See supra Section I.B.2.
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improves data collection practices in some ways.119 However, what
happens when a firm’s data practices do not contradict its privacy policy
but nonetheless remain inadequate?
The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit faced this
question in one of the few cases on Section 5, LABMD, Inc. v. FTC.120
Rather than relying on the deceptive prong of Section 5, the FTC alleged
the defendant’s data practices violated the unfairness prong of Section
5.121 Specifically, the FTC argued that the defendant’s practices were
unfair, meaning the practice was one that (1) causes substantial injury
to consumers and (2) offends public policy well-grounded in statutes or
the common law.122 With respect to the second element, the court failed
to definitively hold whether the FTC’s unfairness claim could be
grounded in a common law theory of negligence.123 Consequently, this
negligence theory remains a potential source of litigation moving
forward.124 Instead the court held the FTC’s order for the defendant to
overhaul its cybersecurity and implement “reasonable standards” was
unenforceable.125 This could significantly limit the FTC’s ability to
address unfair or inadequate data security practices before a breach
occurs.126 The FTC relies on the threat of enforcement to incentivize
firms to comply with its data protection standards.127 If the FTC is
limited to merely enforcing the terms of a firm’s privacy policy or the
FTC’s unfairness claims must allege specific data failures and
remedies, then it will mostly serve as a reactive regulator rather than
a proactive one.128
2. Limited Resources and Advantages
Aside from the legal restraints on its Section 5 authority, the
FTC is also an agency with limited resources when it comes to data

119.
See generally Solove & Hartzog, supra note 79, at 587, 604.
120.
MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 33–34.
121.
See LABMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1225 (11th Cir. 2018).
122.
Id. at 1228–29.
123.
See id. at 1231 (“We will assume arguendo that the Commission [was] correct and that
LabMD’s negligent failure to design and maintain a reasonable data-security program invaded
consumers’ right of privacy and thus constituted an unfair act or practice.”).
124.
See MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 33–34.
125.
LABMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1235–37 (holding that the FTC’s order to LabMD to
overhaul and replace its data-security program to meet an “indeterminable standard of
reasonableness” made the command unenforceable).
126.
See MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 34.
127.
See supra Section II.B.
128.
See LABMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1237; MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 33.
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protection and privacy.129 As a result, the FTC must be particularly
careful when considering enforcement actions, only pursuing those that
offer the highest reward or the most effective form of deterrence.130 The
FTC’s limited resources are especially evident when compared to
privacy enforcers in other countries.131 Whereas most agencies in other
countries focus entirely on privacy regulation, privacy is simply one
part of the FTC’s complicated and expansive regulatory jurisdiction.132
Despite these limitations, the FTC remains a data regulator
with specific advantages that should not be overlooked. Several have to
do with the agency’s structure. First, it is resistant to regulatory
capture in ways other agencies are not because it does not regulate a
single coherent industry.133 Second, because of its broad focus,
it does not get bogged down in procedural practices for protecting
information.134 Third, the FTC is an independent agency, which allows
at least some bipartisan representation as well as staggered terms for
commissioners;135 this arguably creates some political insulation.136
However, the most important advantage the FTC has as a
regulator is experience implementing a complex privacy regulatory
regime.137 The FTC has emerged as the de facto privacy regulator
governing vast segments of the private sector with little direction from
Congress.138 It is tasked with overseeing privacy provisions in eight
other federal statutes, including COPPA and the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FRCA).139 Moreover, the FTC has the ability to react nimbly to
changes in the market and changes in the technology.140 Given these

129.
Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The FTC Can Rise to the
Privacy Challenge, but Not Without Help from Congress, BROOKINGS INST.: TECHTANK (Aug. 8,
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/08/08/the-ftc-can-rise-to-the-privacy-challenge-but-not-without-help-from-congress/ [https://perma.cc/5W56-YA5N].
130.
Id.
131.
See id. (“[The FTC] carries out [its] mission with a budget of just over $300 million
and a total staff of about 1,100, of whom no more than 50 are tasked with privacy. In comparison,
the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has over 700 employees and a £38 million
budget for a mission focused entirely on privacy and data protection.”).
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Id.
136.
See id.
137.
See, e.g., id.
138.
See id.
139.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2018 2 (2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2018/2018-privacy-data-security-report-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q55V-QPNG].
140.
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 79, at 589.
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advantages, the FTC has significant value as a data regulator, despite
its limited enforcement capabilities, that would not be easily replaced.
C. Limitations of State Regulation
By responding to a data breach or imposing tougher data
protection measures, states can influence businesses’ behavior.141 Yet,
their limited jurisdictional reach creates problems for consumers and
firms.142 For example, most states have data breach notification
requirements with strict penalties for companies that fail to comply.143
In 2018, Uber paid a $148 million settlement for failing to notify
consumers of a data breach.144 However, this state notification system
has been described as a “fragmented, incoherent liability scheme.”145
Each state has unique and sometimes inconsistent reporting
requirements that impose significant compliance costs.146 Determining
whether an individual is a resident of a particular state is also difficult
and might even require a company to collect more data on an individual
than it would otherwise.147 Notification laws are just one form of state
regulation, but other forms of state regulation present similar
problems.148
D. National Legislation
Given the issues with federal statutes and the costs of state
regulation, a federal response to data breaches seems inevitable.
Indeed, according to a 2019 Pew Research study, 75 percent of
Americans believe there should be more regulation of private firms’ use
of personal data. Moreover, only 8 percent of firms believe they should
be regulated less.149
One possible model for federal data breach legislation is the
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). GDPR
141.
142.
143.

See MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 36–37.
See id. at 37.
See GINA STEVENS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42475, DATA SECURITY BREACH
NOTIFICATION LAWS 5–7 (2012).
144.
Kate Conger, Uber Settles Data Breach Investigation for $148 Million, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/technology/uber-data-breach.html
[https://perma.cc/P3A5-FNRH].
145.
STEVENS, supra note 143, at 5.
146.
Jacqueline May Tom, A Simple Compromise: The Need for a Federal Data Breach
Notification Law, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1569, 1570–71 (2010).
147.
Id.
148.
See MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 36–37.
149.
Auxier et al., supra note 24.
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applies to any company that handles European data, so many
multinational firms must already comply with its provisions.150 It
regulates the “collection, use, storage, organization, disclosure or any
other operation or set of operations performed on personal data” and
defines personal data broadly.151 It is centered on a set of individual
privacy and data control rights, much like the CCPA.152 However,
unlike the CCPA, it also includes specific, risk-based security
measures153 and a privacy-by-design approach in which firms only
collect the data minimally necessary to complete a lawful purpose.154 In
addition, GDPR contains breach notification requirements that require
firms to notify designated government authorities and affected
individuals within seventy-two hours of a breach.155 Individual member
states enforce the provisions of GDPR and are permitted to issue
significant fines for serious infractions.156 Individuals are also
guaranteed judicial recourse in the event of a breach.157
GDPR clearly addresses many of the issues associated with data
breaches,158 but such prescriptive regulations have their costs. GDPR is
an incredibly complex law and continues to add significant new
obligations for firms handling data.159 The average cost of becoming
GDPR compliant in 2018 was approximately $3 million per firm.160
Notably, these heavy costs tend to strengthen the largest players with
the resources and experts needed to comply with the law while pricing
out smaller firms.161 Even US firms valued in the billions like Williams
Sonoma and Valve have had to exit the European market because of the

150.
See MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 42–43.
151.
Id. at 42–51.
152.
Id. at 44–45, 50–51.
153.
Id. at 46–47.
154.
Matthew R. A. Heiman, The GDPR and the Consequences of Big Regulation, 47 PEPP.
L. REV. 945, 947 (2020).
155.
MULLIGAN & LINEBAUGH, supra note 8, at 47–48
156.
Id. at 50.
157.
Id.
158.
See discussion supra Section II.A.
159.
See Heiman, supra note 154, at 949; Lauren Feiner, California’s New Privacy
Law Could Cost Companies a Total of $55 Billion to Get in Compliance, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/05/california-consumer-privacy-act-ccpa-could-cost-companies-55billion.html [https://perma.cc/Z9KB-Y3S5] (last updated Oct. 8, 2019, 10:38 AM).
160.
IAPP-EY Annual Privacy Governance Report 2018, IAPP RES. CTR., https://iapp.org/
resources/article/iapp-ey-annual-governance-report-2018/ [https://perma.cc/H6MV-2245] (last
visited Feb. 2, 2021).
161.
Heiman, supra note 154, at 949.
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costs of compliance associated with GDPR.162 Additionally, the
implementation of GDPR was accompanied by a decline in European
venture capital and start-up firms.163 While the importance of consumer
data protection cannot be ignored, at a certain point, heavy regulation
may impose costs that hurt innovation and deter beneficial consumer
products and services.164
In light of these costs, the CCPA might serve as a better model
for national legislation. The CCPA ultimately has fewer sweeping
provisions than GDPR.165 Regarding data protection, the “reasonable
security measures” requirement allows data holders, rather than
regulators, to set data security practices.166 This is more consistent with
the FTC’s approach to data security, which generates an ecosystem of
mutual governance between firms and regulators.167 Compared to
GDPR, the CCPA also implements far fewer stringent fines for
violations. However, the cost of CCPA compliance is estimated to be
quite similar to GDPR.168 This is likely because the costs of compliance
are mostly attached to privacy requirements, like hiring privacy staff,
rather than technical protections against data breaches.169 Indeed,
more business executives seem to regard privacy governance as
separate from the issue of data breaches altogether.170 Congress could
take an approach similar to GDPR or the CCPA, but this type of
regulation is expensive, and both are primarily centered on individual
privacy. Both can and should serve as useful models for Congress, but
an effective and comprehensive solution to the public harm associated
with data breaches will require a different approach.

162.
The 10 Problems of the GDPR: The US Can Learn from the EU’s Mistakes and Leapfrog
Its Policy: Statement Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. 3–4 (2019) [hereinafter GDPR
Hearing] (statement of Roslyn Layton, Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute).
163.
Id. at 2–4.
164.
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 20, at 134–35.
165.
See supra Section II.B.
166.
Cf. Anne S. Peterson, Industry Insight: The CCPA’s Elusive “Reasonable Security” Safe
Harbor, MCGUIREWOODS (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.passwordprotectedlaw.com/2020/02/ccpareasonable-security/ [https://perma.cc/7FN8-9ZU4] (stating that because the CCPA does not define
what constitutes “reasonable security,” data-holding companies are largely left to interpret that
provision themselves).
167.
See GDPR Hearing, supra note 162, at 12–14.
168.
Feiner, supra note 159.
169.
See IAPP-EY Annual Privacy Governance Report 2018, supra note 160.
170.
Id.
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III. A DATA SUPERFUND STATUTE
If the release of data is to be best understood as a public harm
like pollution, then an effective regulatory approach should incorporate
lessons from environmental law. That said, using environmental law as
a model can be difficult as environmental regulation encompasses
numerous modes of regulation.171 This is in part because the
environment is a complex and highly interconnected system; as such,
many of the root causes of pollution are also systematic.172 Indeed, the
data environment is no different, and with this understanding,
regulating data like regulating the environment will likely require a
nuanced and multifaceted regulatory approach.173 Arguably, this is
already occurring in an incremental fashion, as Congress and the states
target specific industries and types of data pollution. While the United
States may not be able to prevent all forms of data pollution, it could
still implement a more comprehensive form of protection.
A. CERCLA as a Comprehensive Solution
1. Getting to CERCLA
Similar to data regulation, environmental regulation has
developed in a piecemeal fashion in response to growing public
awareness and concern about pollution.174 The most significant
environmental statutes were passed during the 1970s and 1980s.175 The
first was the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which
requires agencies to conduct an environmental impact statement before
any major federal action.176 Congress also enacted two particularly
sweeping and ambitious statutes targeted toward specific types of
pollution: the Clean Water Act (CWA), regulating discharges into the
water, and the Clean Air Act (CAA), regulating emissions into the air.177
171.
See Neil Gunningham, Enforcing Environmental Regulation, 23 J. ENV’T L. 169,
172–74 (2011).
172.
See generally Clean Air Act Overview, Air Pollution: Current and Future Challenges,
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/air-pollution-current-and-future-challenges [https://perma.cc/A8L4-YSRZ] (last visited Feb. 3, 2021).
173.
See Gunningham, supra note 171.
174.
See generally Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United
States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United
States, 20 VA. ENV’T L.J. 75 (2001) (discussing the creation and evolution of environmental law in
the United States and the gradual means by which that occurred).
175.
See generally id. (outlining the most relevant environmental statutes in the United
States, revealing that the majority of them were passed in the 1970s and 1980s).
176.
Id. at 77.
177.
Id. at 78–79.
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Even in the face of an energy crisis and industry resistance, these laws
survived with only minor modifications.178 Indeed, Congress went on to
pass several more environmental laws targeted towards toxic and
hazardous substances.179
This period of environmental legislative action culminated with
the passage of the last major environmental legislation to date, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), also known as the Superfund.180 CERCLA was passed
in response to alarming hazardous waste practices and management in
the 1970s.181 It was arguably the most far-reaching of all environmental
statutes.182 Its basic design is relatively simple. CERCLA imposes strict
liability for the release or threatened release of any “hazardous
substances,” which encompasses just about any toxic substance as well
as any substance the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) deems
“an imminent and substantial danger” to public health or safety.183
Additionally, CERCLA liability is broad; it is the first environmental
statute that subjects every major Fortune 500 company, many small
businesses, and nonprofit institutions to environmental liability.184
Since its passage, CERCLA has been subject to criticism, and
scholars continue to debate its effectiveness.185 The original statute was
rushed through Congress, which left courts to grapple with a number of
ambiguities.186 While there are many problems with CERCLA as a
statute, a full analysis of its provisions is beyond this Note. However,
the basic design of this statute still offers a particularly compelling
regulatory model for data breaches.
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See id. at 82–83
179.
Id. at 83.
180.
Id.
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ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P.
LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 409 (8th ed. 2018).
182.
Lazarus, supra note 174, at 84.
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42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), 9604(a); see PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 181, at 410–11.
184.
Lazarus, supra note 174, at 89.
185.
See generally Justin R. Pidot & Dale Ratliff, The Common Law of Liable Party
CERCLA Claims, 70 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2018) (debating the viability of CERCLA in light of the
changing liability framework overseen by the EPA); Keely Maxwell, Brittany Kiessling & Jenifer
Buckley, How Clean Is Clean: A Review of the Social Science of Environmental Cleanups, 13 ENV’T
RSCH. LETTERS, no. 8, 2018, at 1 (discussing the merits of various environmental cleanup efforts,
including CERCLA, through the lens of various publications that discuss the issue).
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See Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of
Hazardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 233 n.230 (1988).
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2. Filling Regulatory Gaps
One advantage of CERCLA is that it serves as a backdrop to
other environmental statutes without supplanting other forms of
regulation.187 Indeed, the statute was partially designed to “fill the
gaps” left by other federal environmental statutes.188 For example,
while the types of hazardous waste covered by the statute are broad, it
specifically exempts substances regulated by other federal statutes.189
Such an accommodating design would be desirable in the context
of data protection. The issue with current federal data breach statutes
is not that they fail to accomplish their statutory objectives; rather, it
is that, together, they fail to comprehensively protect data.190 Arguably,
statutes like HIPAA, which regulates data pollution from health care
providers, and COPPA, which regulates data pollution from minors,
play a similar role as the CWA or CAA. Public concern over data
collection varies among specific purposes and industries.191 Protecting
certain types of data, like data relating to children, may demand stricter
regulations while other types may not be as critical to protect.
At the same time, CERCLA’s liability regime holds nearly all
environmental polluters accountable, which prevents businesses from
escaping liability. CERCLA liability extends not only to parties that
actually dispose of hazardous waste but also to the parties that generate
and transport the waste.192 Over time, courts have interpreted this
liability to be “strict, joint and several, and retroactive.”193 Considering
the data collection and resale practices of data brokers, such liability in
the context of data breaches could play a critical role in holding
businesses accountable. Under current law, as long as a business
permits data sharing in its privacy policy, it can sell data to
irresponsible third parties without any consequences.
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3. Incentives
CERCLA’s liability regime also serves as a powerful incentive
for businesses to prevent environmental pollution from occurring in the
first place. Under a strict liability regime, parties are held accountable
for any harm that results from certain activities, often characterized
as ultrahazardous activities, regardless of the level of care they
exercised.194
Strict liability has been discussed as an effective tool to
encourage data security and prevent data breaches.195 Generally
speaking, the certainty of liability in the event a breach occurs and the
financial penalties that come along with it would force firms that collect
and hold data to internalize the full costs of their activities.196 Ideally,
this would prevent the firms that are operating with suboptimal levels
of data protection from entering the market in the first place.197
4. Administration
Furthermore, CERCLA, unlike other environmental statutes,
not only serves to prevent environmental pollution from occurring but
it also enables regulators to take direct action in response to the release
of pollutants.198 Although liability is at the heart of CERCLA, the
statute complements this liability with specific response and
remediation provisions.199
Despite many similarities, data has certain unique qualities
that make this part of the CERCLA model difficult to replicate.200
Prominent examples include the cleanup requirements, which direct
the EPA to establish standards and actually clean up polluted sites.201
Unlike the cleanup of localized hazardous waste, data cannot be
scrubbed, and it may very well be impossible to retrieve once it has been
released.202
Nevertheless, there are still two critical, ex-post provisions of
CERCLA that would serve to improve federal responses to data
breaches. One such provision is the notification requirements under
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Section 103(a).203 This Section requires a party who is responsible for a
release of a hazardous substance exceeding the regulatory limit to
immediately notify a National Response Center.204 Similar notification
requirements could apply to companies that release a certain amount
of personal data as a result of a data breach. Another part of CERCLA
that would be particularly useful for data breaches is the superfund
provision, which provides the EPA with independent financing to
respond to and clean up releases.205 This provision is quite similar to
the Consumer Privacy Fund provisions in the CCPA.206 Although data
cannot be cleaned, there are still mitigation techniques that can be
employed to shift and spread the costs of a breach.207 A data regulator
with independent funding would not have to wait for lengthy judicial
proceedings to take action when a breach occurs.
B. Implementing a Data Superfund Statute
1. Statutory Objectives
When it comes to implementing a data superfund statute,
inevitably, the CERCLA model would need to be adjusted, but as a
whole it offers numerous advantages compared to other models of data
regulation. Importantly, a data superfund statute modeled after
CERCLA would remain primarily focused on protecting data without
sacrificing some privacy objectives. Privacy is no doubt important in
some contexts, but prescriptive privacy regimes like GDPR and the
CCPA are expensive.208 Privacy costs may be justifiable for health care
data or children’s data, but they would likely lead to unacceptable
inefficiencies if applied to the economy as a whole.209 A data protection
statute modeled after CERCLA would allow for a more flexible
approach to privacy. Moreover, strict liability and joint liability, even in
a regime focused on public harms, would allow the data superfund
statute to indirectly improve consumer privacy. For instance, the risk
of future liability may encourage behavior that is otherwise required by
the GDPR privacy-by-design provision.210 Instead of requiring a lawful
purpose to collect minimally necessary data, firms with suboptimal
203.
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205.
206.
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208.
209.
210.
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levels of data protection would face powerful incentives to not collect
more data than necessary for their business purpose.211
2. Allocating Responsibility
Implementing strict and joint liability under a data superfund
statute would also serve to allocate responsibility for preventing
breaches in a more effective way.212 Since this type of liability
essentially rises proportionately to the potential harm of a breach, firms
could weigh the costs and risks of a breach on their own terms.213
Although this could also lead to overcompliance, there are fewer
opportunity costs and efficiency losses resulting from the government
incorrectly weighing the risks of data collection practices.214
Furthermore, without as many prescriptive requirements, companies
may be spared the heaviest GDPR expenses that result from mandatory
compliance personnel.215
Holding firms jointly liable would also make sense in the context
of data because firms are usually in a better position than consumers to
assess the quality of a business’s data protection measures.216 This is
particularly salient considering consumers’ behavior towards privacy
policies and the privacy paradox more generally.217 While consumers
will continue to provide information to firms with suboptimal data
practices, a firm is unlikely to ignore the risk of liability.218 In
particular, even if firms were to transfer data to third parties or protect
themselves with a contract, they would still ultimately be responsible
to the public.219
Nevertheless, there are downsides to this approach. A single
business with adequate security standards could be left footing the bill
because another business was irresponsible. CERCLA allows parties to
seek out contribution from other liable parties, but this can be difficult
in practice.220 However, many of these concerns were created by court
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interpretations of a hastily written statute.221 A data superfund statute
could avoid these mistakes, for example, by making joint liability
explicit in the statute.
3. Utilizing Existing Structures
Another advantage to the CERCLA model is that Congress could
use existing state and federal regulatory structures to implement a data
protection equivalent. The FTC could serve the same role for the data
superfund statute as the EPA does for CERCLA.222 As discussed in
Section II.B.2, the FTC already has significant expertise and experience
enforcing privacy regulation in the United States.223 The FTC
Commissioner has a narrower set of responsibilities than an attorney
general but retains the advantage of having a broader interest than
European data regulators.224 Moreover, companies seeking to avoid
liability under the data superfund statute could largely follow FTC
guidance. Since the Act would center around liability rather than
specific terms, the FTC and courts could continue to build off the
Section 5 common law of privacy.225 This would provide more
flexibility—similar to the reasonable security duty in the CCPA—with
less uncertainty.226
Furthermore, the FTC would administer the data trust fund and
initiate data cleanups. To mitigate private costs, the FTC could ensure
that consumers immediately receive identity theft protection. This is
already something the FTC incorporates into settlements after a data
breach, except with a trust fund it could be done without lengthy
judicial proceedings.227 For more public costs, the FTC could provide
Congress, other government agencies, and state governments the
information they need to implement new policies to respond to a
breach. It could also coordinate an industry response among major
stakeholders, such as data insurers, cybersecurity firms, and banks.
As part of enforcement, CERCLA also enables a private cause of
action; thus, private individuals bear the burden of enforcement along
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with government regulators.228 This is present in both GDPR and the
CCPA but absent from many federal data protection requirements.229
However, unlike the CCPA, a data superfund statute would contain no
qualifying language or “reasonable security” safe harbor to prevent
lawsuits.230 This feature has the potential to relieve regulatory burdens
that would be more prominent for an agency like the FTC, which
already faces limited resources.231
A data superfund statute could work in tandem with state
law when it comes to notification requirements. A national data
breach response center would provide a uniform reporting system for
businesses while utilizing state frameworks to carry out the response.
This would allow federal regulators to build off the experiences of state
regulators enforcing state notification laws while addressing the
problems associated with the current patchwork of state and federal
statutes.232 Much like GDPR, it could coordinate responses and require
notification in the event of a breach. Although regulators cannot
necessarily retrieve data, a national response system could still improve
accountability and give victims and policy makers more of an
opportunity to mitigate damages.233
IV. CONCLUSION
The current regulatory approach and public concerns associated
with data breaches are overwhelmingly focused on protecting
individual privacy. While consumer privacy is important, this
framework only addresses one aspect of the data problem. The harms
associated with data breaches go beyond identity theft or personal
exposure. As personal data are collected on an increasingly massive
scale, the predictive capacity of this data will correspondingly expand.
With this will come insight into human behavior that could provide
substantial benefits to society, but it could also serve as a potent
weapon to exploit the public. Data breaches are fundamentally social
problems, and the federal government must do more to prevent these
social harms.
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GDPR and the CCPA exhibit a primarily privacy-based
approach to data breaches. Although they are comprehensive, these
statutes present significant costs to businesses and regulators alike.
A data superfund statute, by contrast, would incorporate some
data protection models from both laws without the significant
compliance costs. Perhaps with advances in technology, expansive
measures ensuring consumer control over personal data might be
justified. Yet, for now, individual privacy would be better served by
a sector-specific approach. A liability-focused regime with limited
prescriptive requirements would provide a flexible but effective
regulatory regime as society defines the contours of privacy rights in
the modern world.
Kyle McKibbin*

*
J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, 2021; B.A., University of
Maryland, College Park, 2016. The Author would like to thank Professor Michael P. Vandenbergh
for his guidance and his environmental law course which served as the inspiration for this Note.
The Author would also like to thank his family, friends, and mentors who encouraged him while
he pursues a career focused on the legal implications of privacy and technology. The board and
staff of the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law deserve a special thank you
for their meticulous work in helping bring this Note to publication.

